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SECURITY INFORMATION

AD/RR

Ch/C

Briefing with General Donovan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 March 1953

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS *CONF*

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: MR 79-2

DATE: 11-13-79 REVIEWER: 372044

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1. On 19 March, [redacted] and I met with General Donovan at 4 o'clock in his office at No. 2 Wall Street. Our briefing of IDI and IWG intelligence support for the economic defense program was interspersed with questions and comments from Gen. Donovan which revealed the following attitudes on his part.

a. He doesn't see how it is possible to do an effective job with so many different agencies involved on so many different committees. He feels that there ought to be more centralization of responsibility for preparation and presentation of intelligence.

b. He feels that at this time there ought to be more of an emphasis on current intelligence for implementation of existing controls as opposed to the preparation of strategic intelligence such as the commodity studies for purposes expanding the control lists.

c. He seems to be generally sympathetic with the conclusions of NIE 59 but does not feel that these conclusions point to a policy of inactivity. Rather he feels that definite action should be taken against individuals engaged in clandestine trade and against the movement of strategic goods particularly in those cases where the goods are really of high priority importance to the Soviet Bloc, e.g., electronics equipment, jet fuel, etc.

d. He feels that there ought to be a tighter liaison with the field. Realizing that collectors [redacted] have other priority problems he feels that if they were made more aware of the specific kinds of information needed about Soviet Bloc procurement of high priority items these collectors would be more responsive to the requirements of the economic defense program.

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2. The General asked that we pass intelligence to him relating to (1) individuals engaged in clandestine trade and (2) vessels carrying strategic cargo to Communist China. In line with my earlier discussions with IAS, OO and OCD, I indicated that all intelligence materials would be passed to him through ODMS and that ODMS channels would be used in transmitting all such materials to him in New York.

3. The actual briefing time lasted well over 2½ hours and Gen. Donovan expressed a very intense interest in the whole subject. He hopes to have such briefings periodically and specifically asked that we pass to him any major problems affecting the intelligence-policy action relationship.

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Ch/C/RR [redacted] (20 March 1953)

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